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ABSTRACT
To what extent do supernatural beliefs, group affiliation, and social interaction produce 
values and behaviors that benefit others, i.e., prosociality? Addressing this question 
involves multiple variables interacting within complex social networks that shape 
and constrain the beliefs and behaviors of individuals. We examine the relationships 
among some of these factors utilizing data from the World Values Survey to inform the 
construction of an Agent-Based Model. The latter was able to identify the conditions 
under which – and the mechanisms by which – the prosociality of simulated agents 
was increased or decreased within an “artificial society” designed to reflect real world 
parameters. The combined results indicated that prosociality was more related to 
agents’ group affiliation and social networks than to their worldview beliefs. It also 
showed that prosociality changed as a function of agents’ worldviews, group affiliation, 
and social network properties. Individuals with supernatural worldviews had higher 
levels of active prosociality, but this was primarily directed toward ingroup members. 
Naturalistic believers and the unaffiliated, on the other hand, tended to have higher 
levels of trust and tolerance. We describe the potential usefulness of such modeling 
techniques for addressing complex problems in the study of secularity and nonreligion. 
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Determining the extent to which religion plays a role in the 
formation and maintenance of group behaviors within 
large-scale social systems is a complex problem and has 
generated a great deal of interest. For example, scholars 
have explored and debated the causal ordering in the 
relationships among religiosity, economic and cultural 
trends, and social development. Some secularization 
theories such as the existential security hypotheses 
postulate that the decline in influence of religious 
concepts and institutions within developed, stable 
societies can be explained by the fact that the former 
are no longer needed within the latter (Barber 2011; 
Norris & Inglehart 2004). Interpreting the precise role of 
religion in society is difficult in part because supernatural 
beliefs are reciprocally related to other social effects in a 
complicated causal nexus. 
Scholars also debate whether it was the emergence 
of religious beliefs in moral high gods that enabled and 
promoted the development of large-scale societies 
(Atkinson & Bourrat 2011; Norenzayan 2016), or 
whether it was societal and economic developments 
that preceded and facilitated the appearance of large-
scale religions (Whitehouse et al. 2019). In other words, 
was it primarily belief in “Big Gods” that drove the rise 
of larger, more pluralistic societies or was it primarily 
factors related to the emergence of “Big Governments” 
that drove the rise of large religious institutions with 
beliefs in more powerful deities (or ultimate realities such 
as Dharma or Dao)? Such questions involve attending to 
the dynamic and multi-causal relationships among the 
component parts of complex systems (Shults, Wildman, 
Lane et al. 2018).
Here we focus on a related problem that has also 
engendered significant discussion among scholars, 
namely, the role of religion in promoting individuals’ 
engagement in actions that benefit others, i.e., 
“prosocial” behaviors. This article explores four research 
questions that deal with the relationships among “active” 
and “passive” forms of prosociality, religious “belief”, 
and religious “affiliation,” which are answered using 
results from a statistical analysis of the World Values 
Survey (WVS) and from computational experiments in an 
Agent-Based Model (ABM) that were able to simulate the 
relevant longitudinal shifts in the WVS. First, we provide 
a survey of the literature and analysis of the current 
scientific debates over these issues. 
RELIGIOUS BELIEF AND PROSOCIALITY
Due to the near-ubiquity of religion across historical time 
and geographical region, it is not surprising that the 
relationship to prosociality has usually been viewed from 
a religiously-normative perspective. Most people who 
are religious presume that religion motivates greater 
prosociality and morality (Pew Research Center 2014). 
Conversely, it is commonly assumed that nonreligious 
individuals are less likely to behave prosocially because 
they do not endorse religious and spiritual beliefs, 
such as the idea that one’s actions are monitored by 
supernatural agents (Gervais & Norenzayan 2012). 
Consequently, sociological and anthropological theories 
have tended to focus on the presumed role that religious 
belief plays in the emergence of prosociality among 
individuals, groups, and societies. The “Big Gods” 
theory conceptualizes religion as a culturally-evolved 
set of beliefs and practices that feature moralizing, 
supernatural agents that monitor prosocial behavior 
and enforce social cohesion (Atkinson & Bourrat 2011; 
Johnson 2005; Norenzayan 2016; Purzycki et al. 2016). 
Such theories suggest a specific historical role for 
shared belief in powerful and socially-interested deities 
who monitor human interactions, which ex hypothesi 
leads to a greater willingness to treat strangers fairly in 
exchanges and facilitates the emergence of cooperative 
norms (Henrich et al. 2010). 
But are socially-shared religious concepts such as 
supernatural monitoring necessary for the emergence of 
cooperative group norms? Or can nonreligious and secular 
social groups generate prosociality without supernatural 
beliefs? Theories postulating that a prevalent belief in God 
is linked to more functional societies are contradicted by 
findings that countries with the greatest proportion of 
nonbelievers – “societies without Gods” – tend to have 
higher, not lower, levels of prosociality (Zuckerman 
2008). Many Big Gods proponents acknowledge that 
although religion initially provided the conditions for 
the establishment of cooperative norms, today these 
functions are often performed by alternative secular 
institutions. In some modern societies, competent 
governance and institutionalized social welfare programs 
have now largely replaced the influence of religious 
concepts and institutions (Guo, Liu, & Tian 2018). In 
the words of Big Gods theorist Ara Norenzayan, secular 
societies have “…climbed the ladder of prosocial religion 
and then kicked it away” (Norenzayan 2016: 18). 
Unfortunately, we cannot “rewind the tape” of history 
while systematically changing parameters in order to 
determine how (or whether) prosocial norms would have 
developed differently in the absence of religious concepts.
COMPLEXITY OF PROSOCIALITY
Another problem complicating the identification of the 
functions of religion in motivating prosociality is the 
complexity (and varying manifestations) of the latter. 
Which aspects of prosocial behavior are most relevant to 
optimal social functioning? Cooperation with unfamiliar 
people such as outgroup members and strangers (rather 
than ingroup members such as kin and neighbors) seems 
to be a necessary condition for a successful large-scale 
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society. This suggests that a fundamental property 
of broader prosocial orientation is the belief that most 
strangers can be trusted. Indeed, generalized trust is 
strongest in the most functional societies (Balliet & Van 
Lange 2013). Because groups typically become more 
heterogeneous as they grow, another component of 
cooperation is tolerance of diverse individuals, which is 
also associated with social groups that are more affluent 
and functional (Florida, Mellander & Stolarick 2008). 
Both trust and tolerance can be thought of as “passive” 
prosocial values in the sense that they require relatively 
little proactive behavior. By contrast, some other forms 
of prosociality require more initiative by way of sharing 
time or resources in assisting others or promoting the 
general welfare of the community. One manifestation of 
“active” prosociality is civic engagement in the form of 
volunteering (Putnam 2000; Wang & Graddy 2008).  
Does religiosity itself contribute to these various 
manifestations of prosociality? In the case of active 
volunteering, establishing a clear, unambiguous causal 
link with religious belief has been problematic. Although 
some studies have suggested that religiosity promotes 
volunteering (Einolf 2011; Petrovic, Chapman, & Schofield 
2018), the literature is marked by contradictory findings. 
Some studies have found that religious attendance is 
associated with increased volunteering (Ruiter & De Graaf 
2006) while others have suggested that this effect may be 
limited to certain countries (Van der Meer et al. 2010). Even 
more confusingly, some studies have found a negative 
relationship between national-level religiosity and 
volunteering (Prouteau & Sardinha 2015). These discrepant 
results exemplify the general difficulty of attempting to 
isolate the effect of religious beliefs in social functioning.
RELIGIOUS OR SECULAR EFFECTS?
It has frequently been assumed that any behavioral 
differences between religious and nonreligious 
individuals are attributable to their beliefs. However, such 
individuals differ in ways unrelated to belief. Religious 
believers tend to be affiliated with religious institutions 
(e.g., membership in a church, temple, or mosque) 
and more regularly attend group-related social events 
(e.g., services, meetings, organized activities). Religious 
groups have been found to be particularly rich in social 
networking, social support, and the encouragement 
of group cohesion via structured activities (Beyerlein & 
Hipp 2006), factors which collectively constitute social 
capital (Putnam & Campbell 2010). Consequently, when 
we compare the prosociality of religious believers and 
nonbelievers, we risk potentially confounding differences 
in worldviews with affiliation-related factors (Galen & 
Kloet 2011a; Galen, Sharp & McNulty 2015). 
Social dynamics have a major influence on prosocial 
actions. For instance, studies attempting to separate 
worldview beliefs from social affiliations have found that 
a range of prosocial behaviors, including volunteering 
and charitable donations, are more closely related 
to active religious group participation (e.g., attending 
services) than to religious identification itself (Burge 
2019; Low et al. 2007). The factors that contribute most 
to greater levels of civic participation and volunteering 
involve access to social contacts and networking 
influences found in religious groups (Becker & Dhingra 
2001; Lewis, MacGregor & Putnam 2013; Monsma 2007). 
Studies that hold constant social factors such as group 
attendance have found that religious beliefs themselves 
are unrelated, or even negatively related, to generalized 
trust and volunteering (Burge 2019; Loveland, Capella & 
Maisonet 2017; Petrovic, et al. 2018; Putnam & Campbell 
2010). Nonreligious individuals also engage in more 
volunteering if they are socially linked to active members 
of religious congregations (Lim & MacGregor 2012), 
which further weakens the claim that religious beliefs are 
the primary driver of prosociality. 
Regardless of their religious or secular ideology, social 
groups can produce prosocial outcomes when they 
include opportunities for structured charitable activity 
and requests for donations of time or money (Becker 
& Dhingra 2001; Merino 2013). In fact, secular and 
humanistic-themed groups featuring social networking 
and positive norms promote prosociality in a manner 
equivalent to religious congregations (Galen, Sharp 
& McNulty 2015). Some nonreligious groups, such as 
“Sunday Assembly,” attempt to incorporate church-
like elements such as music, uplifting messages, and 
participation in small group activities, which increase 
secular participants’ well-being over time (Price & 
Launay 2018). Such findings suggest that supernatural 
beliefs do not constitute the core prosocial element of 
group participation. Unfortunately, one consequence of 
conflating religious beliefs with group affiliation is that 
discussions of factors distinguishing religious believers 
from nonbelievers tend to focus more on differences in 
supernatural beliefs rather than on social and group-
related factors.
SCOPE OF PROSOCIALITY
The patterns of prosocial values and behaviors are 
not simply manifested indiscriminately but are 
often contingent upon the identity of the intended 
beneficiaries. Parochial (restricted, or tribal) prosociality 
refers to values (e.g., trust) or behaviors (e.g., charitable 
donations) that apply selectively only to those within a 
circumscribed radius, such as kin, fellow co-religionists, 
or members of a specific cultural ingroup (Saroglou 
2006). By contrast, universal prosociality refers to 
prosocial behaviors that are performed for outgroup as 
well as ingroup members. There is evidence that religious 
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factors lead to a tribalization of prosociality, channeling 
it towards ingroup members and constraining the radius 
of concern (Putnam & Campbell 2010). For instance, 
studies have found that religious belief is associated 
with volunteering for beneficiaries that affirm religious 
values but not with volunteering for secular causes (Lam 
2002). By contrast, nonreligious individuals have a more 
universal or extended pattern of prosociality (McKay 
& Whitehouse 2015; Shariff, Piazza & Kramer 2014). 
Those who are unaffiliated volunteer at equivalent or 
greater rates than the religiously affiliated when the 
type of volunteering is generalized and not via a religious 
organization (Cragun 2013; Emerson & Sikkink 2006). As 
a result, religious effects on volunteering are weak to 
nonexistent in general community contexts when the 
recipient is not identifiably religious (Low et al. 2007; 
Monsma 2007; Wang & Graddy 2008). We can therefore 
generally characterize the role of religiosity as having 
more of an effect on where and why people volunteer 
rather than on whether or not they volunteer (Borgonovi 
2008; Galen, Sharp & McNulty 2015). 
To understand the relative scope (parochial or 
universal) of the passive prosocial values mentioned 
above (trust and tolerance), it is important to note the 
way in which the expression of prosociality is intertwined 
with the characteristics of individuals’ social relationships 
and networks. Social affiliations and groups vary in ways 
that affect the extent to which members trust those 
within, as opposed to those outside, the group. Social 
interaction and contacts made within a homogeneous 
group (“bonding” social capital) are distinct from 
heterogeneous contacts with others in different groups 
(“bridging” social capital). Bridging capital is associated 
with a more universal form of prosociality, manifested 
in generalized trust and communal volunteering. By 
contrast, tribal or bonding prosociality is characterized 
by lower trust and intolerance of heterogeneity. These 
distinctions are directly relevant to religiously-affiliated 
groups because while they have strong within-group 
network ties they tend to have weaker outgroup ties. This 
effect is related to the fact that religious groups typically 
have more homogeneous and homophilous social 
networks relative to the networks of nonreligious and 
unaffiliated individuals (Cheadle & Schwadel 2012), as 
well as the fact that nonreligious individuals tend to show 
more generalized trust (Loveland, Capella & Maisonet 
2017; Welch, Sikkink, & Loveland 2007). Thus, the same 
dynamics at work in the promotion of social bonding and 
capital within religious groups are also linked to ingroup 
homophily and to intolerance of those outside the group.
CHANGES IN BELIEF AND AFFILIATION 
The dynamic nature of religious beliefs and group 
affiliation also makes it difficult to determine their 
influence on altruistic behavior. Do changes in belief 
and affiliation over time affect the emergence and/or 
expression of prosociality? For example, if an individual’s 
prosocial pattern is formed within a religious group 
context as a function of social network influences, 
would this pattern be altered if that person’s religious 
beliefs changed? Answering such questions requires a 
more general understanding of what factors precipitate 
decreased religious belief (sometimes referred to as 
apostasy). The factors most frequently examined in the 
psychological literature in this regard have tended to 
be individual differences in personality and cognition. 
For example, traits such as openness to experience and 
authoritarianism (involving the tendency to welcome 
diversity in the case of the former, and oppose it in the 
case of the latter) have been found to predict decreased 
versus sustained or increased religiosity, respectively 
(Galen & Kloet 2011a; Wink, Dillon & Prettyman 
2007). Those raised in nonreligious environments 
who subsequently convert to religiosity in adulthood 
self-report higher levels of authoritarianism. This 
contrasts with those whose religiosity has decreased 
over time, who more often report having tolerant and 
nonauthoritarian personalities (Altemeyer & Hunsberger 
1997). It is notable that trait authoritarianism at its core 
involves an emphasis on strong ingroup loyalty combined 
with outgroup suspicion and intolerance. 
Although these factors have been reliably linked to 
retrospective reports of religious change, there are still 
questions regarding whether these traits have a pre-
existing influence that triggers religious change over 
time. Do such traits predispose individuals to a trajectory 
of decreased religiosity, or do these traits develop as 
a consequence of decreased religiosity? Studies that 
are most informative in this regard are longitudinal in 
design. Even these results are not entirely consistent. For 
example, one study found that those with higher levels 
of the prosocial personality trait agreeableness earlier in 
life tend to become more religious over time (McCullough 
et al. 2005). However, another study found the same 
association but in the reverse causal order – higher 
levels of religious values earlier in youth predicted later 
increases in agreeableness (Huuskes, Ciarrochi & Heaven 
2013).
As outlined above, given the importance of ingroup 
relationships in determining the quality and degree of 
prosociality, interpersonal influences are arguably the 
most important factors in determining religious change. 
The presence of fellow believers serves a protective 
function in maintaining and defending worldviews from 
potential threats. Without social support, the cognitive 
dissonance resulting from exposure to disconfirmatory 
information can lead to doubts or wholesale worldview 
rejection (Festinger, Reicken & Schachter 1956). One 
method by which groups characterized as sharing a 
homogeneous worldview typically maintain cohesion 
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is limiting members’ contacts with outsiders with 
worldviews (Galanter 1980). In addition to factors 
originating externally to the group such as contact 
with those who do not share group values, within-
group factors may also influence belief change, albeit 
not always in a belief-affirming direction. For instance, 
negative interpersonal interactions within the believer’s 
group (e.g., a perceived failure of others to live up 
to ideals) can cause individuals to doubt previously-
accepted, normative group beliefs (Hunsberger et al. 
1996; Krause & Ellison 2009). Therefore, not only is the 
heterogeneity of the group’s social network predictive 
of belief change, but so are the quality and valence of 
relationships with others in the network.
In the case of religious belief change, social influences 
within religiously-normative cultures have typically 
tended to function more in the direction of increasing 
religious affiliation. By contrast, the process of disaffiliation 
or rejection of beliefs tends to be a more solitary one. 
In one study, nonreligious college students who were 
raised religiously described an individualistic journey of 
shedding their beliefs that was self-initiated through 
their own search for the truth. The same study found that 
converts to religion were socially assisted via contacts 
with religious friends and significant others (Altemeyer 
& Hunsberger 1997). Relatively small differences in 
religious belief earlier in life tend to become amplified or 
polarized as individuals self-sort into like-minded social 
groups (Ozorak 1989). A person who has difficulty with 
a religious upbringing or church may elect to attend 
a secular university or socialize within peer networks 
that include nonreligious individuals, which can further 
erode religious beliefs. This also illustrates the difficulty 
in studying changes in prosociality as a function of major 
variables such as supernatural belief, group affiliation, 
and social network properties – all these parameters 
could potentially interact in a multi-causal way.
USE OF COMPUTER MODELING
One tool that is increasingly being used to examine 
such problems involving multi-causality is agent-based 
modeling (ABM). By using this method, a phenomenon 
can be modeled as a collection of autonomous 
decision-making entities (agents). Each simulated agent 
individually assesses its situation and makes decisions 
based on a set of rules, executing various behaviors 
and interactions within an artificial society. Repeated 
interactions among agents are a feature of ABM. This 
feature highlights dynamics related to the phenomenon 
out of the reach of more static analytical methods 
(Axelrod 1997; Epstein & Axtell 1996). A simple ABM can 
exhibit complex behavior patterns and provide valuable 
information about the dynamics of the emulated 
phenomenon (Reynolds 1987). In addition, agents may 
be capable of evolving, allowing unanticipated behaviors 
to emerge. ABM lends advantages in studying social 
scientific phenomena such as those in which individuals’ 
behavior may be contingent on the behaviors of others, 
including changes that occur over time (Madsen et al. 
2019).
This helps to explain why this methodology is 
increasingly being applied to issues in the scientific 
study of religion and nonreligion (Iannaccone 2007; 
Makowsky 2019; Gore et al. 2018; Lane, Shults & 
McCauley, 2019; Shults, 2018; Shults, Gore, Wildman et 
al. 2018; Shults, Lane, Diallo et al. 2018) In one example 
of such an application, Lane (2018) used an ABM to 
study cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game. 
Agents’ belief in supernatural punishment (i.e., belief 
that defecting in interactions with other agents will be 
punished) was manipulated. The results did not support 
the theory that belief in supernatural punishment causes 
greater cooperation in a population.
CURRENT STUDY
In an attempt to address questions regarding how 
supernatural beliefs, group affiliation, and social network 
properties all relate to the emergence of prosociality, we 
developed an Agent-Based Prosociality Model, based on 
real world data from the World Values Survey (WVS). This 
involved: (1) the operationalization of prosociality with 
respect to supernatural beliefs, group affiliation, and 
social networks in multiples waves of data collection 
from the World Values Survey and previously established 
ABM; (2) statistical analysis of the WVS data set using 
the operationalization to identify statistically significant 
differences; (3) reproducing the same statistically 
significant differences within an extended ABM and (4) 
analyzing the ABM to produce an explanation of the 
causes of statistically significant differences observed 
in the WVS. Thus, for each of the research questions 
discussed below, we first report our analysis of the real-
world WVS findings followed by the ABM findings that 
help to reveal which dynamics in the model produce the 
observed outcomes. 
Our main variables of interest include the 
worldviews of individuals or agents (i.e., supernatural 
or naturalistic), affiliation status (members of a club or 
unaffiliated), and types of prosociality (i.e., active and 
passive). It was hypothesized that individuals who had 
supernatural worldviews and who were affiliated with 
supernatural worldview groups would display greater 
levels of prosociality relative to those with naturalistic 
worldviews or those unaffiliated with shared-worldview 
groups. However, it was also predicted that the type of 
prosociality performed by groups with a shared religious 
worldview would be largely confined to the group, as 
opposed to universalistic in nature. Whereas the first 
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set of the modeling studies (research questions 1 and 
2) examined prosocial behaviors as a function of fixed or 
static worldviews and affiliation, the second set (research 
questions 3 and 4) utilized longitudinal data to incorporate 
changes in worldview and affiliation over time. This was 
designed to untangle the causal relationships between 
individuals’ levels of trust and tolerance and their social 
affiliation and interactions. Specifically, these studies 
attempted to determine whether prosociality preceded 
changes in belief or affiliation or were largely a result of 
such change.  
METHODS
PROCEDURE
We analyzed the longitudinal data and survey data from 
two waves (Wave 2; 1990–1994 and Wave 4: 1999–2004) 
of the WVS. The corresponding Agent Based Model (ABM) 
was created using the Artificial Society Analytics Platform 
(ASAP), which provides an artificial society in which agents 
have simulated experiences such as growing up, moving 
into the work force, marrying, having children, and dying 
(Shults et al. 2020). In the simulations described below, 
agents were programmed to have certain worldviews, 
affiliations, and other values that could change over time 
as a result of interactions with other agents, known as 
“alters.” The degree and direction of changes in agents’ 
beliefs depended upon such factors as consistency with 
the worldview of the encountered alters (for details, see 
online supplemental material). 
MEASURES
WVS Worldview
Using the WVS data, we categorized individuals as having 
a supernatural worldview if they reported belief in God, 
heaven, or hell. If they denied belief in all three, then their 
worldview was categorized as naturalistic. Those with 
mixed patterns (i.e., answering any of the three items 
differently or “Don’t Know”) were excluded from analysis. 
ABM Worldview
In the ABM simulation, agents were deemed to have a 
supernatural (i.e. belief in God), or naturalist (no belief 
in God) worldview, depending upon whether their value 
was above or below 0.5, respectively. 
WVS Affiliation
Using the WVS data, individuals were deemed to be 
affiliated with a shared-worldview group if they reported 
a supernatural worldview and attended religious 
services at least once a month. We labelled these 
groups “worldview clubs.” The analysis was limited to 
supernatural worldview club affiliation because of a lack 
of cross-cultural surveys that included data on group 
affiliation with naturalist worldview clubs and active 
prosociality (i.e., volunteerism).
ABM Affiliation
In the ABM simulation, agents with a supernatural 
worldview could also be affiliated with a supernatural 
worldview club, which had a designated leader called 
an exemplar. Agents were considered affiliated if 
they had a supernatural worldview, had a neutral or 
positive interaction with the exemplar agent, observed 
the exemplar agent act in a manner consistent with a 
supernatural worldview, or had an outgroup suspicion 
value (defined below) above a specified threshold. 
Conversely, agents could disaffiliate if their worldview 
was no longer supernatural, if they had negative 
interactions with the exemplar agent, if the exemplar 
agent acted inconsistently with their worldview, or if the 
agent’s outgroup suspicion was below the threshold.
ABM Social Network Properties
Within the agent-based simulation, agents interacted 
with different types of social networks including the: 
(1) agent’s family, (2) agent’s online social network, 
(3) agent’s offline social network, (4) agent’s neighbors 
(neighborhood), (5) agent’s co-workers (job), if the 
agent had a job, and (6) other members affiliated with 
the same supernatural worldview club, if the agent was 
affiliated with a supernatural worldview club. Family 
networks consisted of parents and siblings; neighborhood 
networks were all agents in the same neighborhood as 
the given agent; online networks were agents selected at 
random from the entire population upon agent inception; 
work networks were all agents working at the same job 
location. Offline social networks were stochastic with the 
probability of being someone else’s alter agent inversely 
proportional to the spatial distance between the given 
agent and the alter. Thus, networks varied in homophily, 
ranging from relatively narrow and homogeneous (e.g., 
restricted to family, worldview club-affiliated) to relatively 
broad and heterogeneous (e.g., outside of affiliation). 
A target agent’s worldview could change by interacting 
with alter agents. Worldview beliefs were either 
strengthened or diminished by observing actions of the 
alter agent as a function of whether: 1) the target agent 
shared the alter agent’s worldview; and 2) the actions 
of the alter agent were consistent versus inconsistent 
with the target agent’s worldview. If the target agent 
observed a consistent action by an alter agent with a 
shared worldview, then the target agent’s worldview 
was strengthened. However, if an alter agent of similar 
worldview was observed performing an inconsistent 
action, then the target agent was conflicted and their 
worldview moved in the opposite direction. This process 
is shown in Figure 1.
WVS Active Prosociality
Within the context of the World Values Survey, we 
defined active prosociality as voluntary acts associated 
with one of the types of organizations listed in Table 1. We 
7Galen et al. Secularism and Nonreligion DOI: 10.5334/snr.128
categorized volunteering for each type of organization as 
tribal, ideological, or universal. Tribal prosocial actions 
were those performed directly for the worldview club to 
which an individual was affiliated. Ideological prosocial 
actions were performed without direct consideration 
for an individual’s worldview but taken on behalf of 
the individual to help themselves and others like them. 
Universal prosocial actions were performed without 
direct consideration for one’s worldview or one’s self.
ABM Active Prosociality
Within the simulation, agents had the opportunity to 
engage in prosocial actions based on a two-step process. 
First, the different types of prosocial action opportunities 
(Table 1) were generated based on the agent’s inclusion 
in different social networks.
Specifically, to be given a tribal prosocial action 
opportunity the agent must have been in a supernatural 
worldview club and drawn a random number between 
0 and 1 from a uniform distribution that went above a 
specified threshold. For ideological and universal prosocial 
actions, the simulation generated opportunities based 
on the involvement in all social networks. This included 
whether or not the agent had a job, was married, and was 
also dependent upon the relative sizes of their online and 
offline social network. In each of these cases a stochastic 
process determined whether an ideological or universal 
prosocial action opportunity was generated. However, 
this likelihood was increased based on the number and 
size of the agent’s online and offline social networks. This 
process is shown in Figure 2.
In order to take a prosocial action an agent must have 
had an opportunity generated and must have accepted 
that opportunity. Acceptance was based on: (1) their level 
of extraversion and (2) whether the previous opportunity 
was accepted. This process is shown in Figure 3.
WVS Passive Prosociality
Within the context of the WVS, passive prosociality was 
defined in two ways: self-reported trust and tolerance 
of others. We based the trust dimension of passive 
prosociality on an individual’s affirmative response to the 
WVS question: “Generally speaking, would you say that 
most people can be trusted” (versus “you need to be very 
careful in dealing with people?”). Tolerance was defined 
as a negative response to the question: “Would you 
prefer to not have these people as neighbors: (1) people 
of a different race and (2) immigrants/foreign workers?”
ABM passive prosociality 
Within the agent-based simulation, passive prosociality 
was also based on trust and tolerance. Trust was 
defined as a normalized measure of the total size of 
an agent’s social networks. For example, an agent with 
a total network size greater than 90% of all the other 
agents’ network size would have a trust level of 0.9. 
Figure 1 The Process by Which an Agent Updates Their Worldview After Interacting With an Alter Agent.




Political Org. Local Community Org.
Universal Social Welfare Org.
Youth Work Org. Sports/Rec. Org.
Arts/Music Org.
Women’s Group Peace 
Movement Org.
3rd World Human Rights Org.
Conservation, Environment or Animal 
Health Org.
Table 1 Operationalization of Prosocial Action Types.
8Galen et al. Secularism and Nonreligion DOI: 10.5334/snr.128
Similarly, an agent whose total social network size was 
at the median value of that of other agents would have 
a level of 0.5. 
The variable of tolerance was based on two other 
variables: the designation of agents as members 
of a majority or a minority group, and their (inverse) 
outgroup suspicion value. If an agent was designated 
as being in the majority group, outgroup suspicion 
reflected the degree of suspicion that agent has 
towards the minority group. If the agent was in the 
minority group, outgroup suspicion reflected the degree 
of suspicion that agent has towards the majority group. 
Interactions with other agents could be categorized as 
positive, negative, or neutral, which could increase or 
decrease the agent’s outgroup suspicion. The value 
of tolerance was inversely proportional to an agent’s 
outgroup suspicion value. In majority-minority and 
minority-majority interactions, if the random number 
drawn by an agent from a uniform distribution 
exceeded their outgroup suspicion value then the 
agent was designated as having a positive interaction, 
increasing their tolerance. If the random number was 
equal or below the agent’s outgroup suspicion value, 
then the agent was designated as having a negative 
interaction, decreasing tolerance. Majority-majority 
and minority-minority interactions were categorized 
as neutral. Thus, higher outgroup suspicion reflected 
the likelihood that an agent would have a negative 
Figure 2 The Process by Which Each Type of Prosocial Action Opportunity is Generated for an Agent.
Figure 3 The Process by Which an Agent Accepts or Refuses Prosocial Action Opportunities.
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interaction with the other group. These dynamics are 
shown in Figure 4.
In the simulation, an agent could remove an alter 
agent from its online or offline social network, which 
were reviewed after each round of interactions. For 
each alter agent in the online or offline social network 
the agent checked whether a specified number of the 
last interactions were neutral or positive. If positive, the 
alter agent was retained in the network; if negative, the 
alter agent was removed. These dynamics are shown in 
Figure 5.
ABM Changes in Affiliation with a Worldview Club
In order to affiliate with a supernatural worldview club 
an agent must: (1) have a supernatural worldview, (2) 
not be in another supernatural worldview club, (3) be 
connected to the club’s exemplar agent in one of their 
social networks, (4) have had their last interaction with 
the exemplar agent be positive or neutral, and either (5a) 
have last observed the exemplar agent act in a manner 
consistent with a supernatural worldview or (5b) have 
tolerance below a specified threshold. An agent could 
leave the supernatural worldview club if any of the 
following were true: (1) their worldview was no longer 
supernatural, (2) a certain number of the last interactions 
with the exemplar agent were not positive or neutral, or 
(3) the agent had not observed the exemplar agent act 
in a manner consistent with the exemplar’s worldview in 
a certain number of the last interactions, and the agent’s 
tolerance was above the specified threshold. These 
processes are shown in Figure 6.
RESULTS
An overview of the questions and results are shown in 
Table 2. In what follows we review each question in detail 
first with the WVS data, followed by a presentation of the 
ABM results and an explanation of the modeling dynamic 
that produced those results.
RESEARCH QUESTION #1: IS PROSOCIALITY 
BASED ON AFFILIATION WITH A 
SUPERNATURAL WORLDVIEW CLUB?
Active Prosociality
Recall that within the WVS data we defined active 
prosociality as voluntary acts for organizations. 
Individuals affiliated with a supernatural worldview club 
Figure 4 The Process by Which an Agent Updates its Outgroup Suspicion (Inverse Tolerance).
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were significantly more likely (M = 42.7%, SD = 0.49) 
than individuals not affiliated with a worldview club (M = 
22.2%, SD = 0.42) to be actively prosocial t(14518) = 28.1, 
p < 0.01. The exclusion of tribal prosociality from the 
analysis reduced the average level of active prosociality 
by individuals in a supernatural worldview club (M = 
30.4%, SD = 0.46). However, it was still significantly 
higher than the active prosociality of the unaffiliated (M 
= 22.2%, SD = 0.42), t(15017) = 11.8, p < 0.01.  
Likewise, within the agent-based simulation, agents 
affiliated with a supernatural worldview club were 
significantly more likely (M = 44.3%, SD = 0.51) than those 
not affiliated with a worldview club (M = 21.0%, SD = 0.40) 
to be actively prosocial t(14374) = 24.4, p < 0.01. When 
tribal prosociality was excluded, (M = 31.3%, SD = 0.45) 
agents affiliated with a supernatural worldview club still 
exhibited active prosociality at a significantly higher level 
than the unaffiliated (M = 21.0%, SD = 0.40), t(15893) = 
10.8, p < 0.01. The higher frequency of prosocial actions 
was attributable the additional social network of the 
supernatural worldview club in which affiliated agents 
received more prosocial action opportunities of each 
Figure 6 The Process by Which an Agent Affiliates or Disaffiliates With a Supernatural Worldview Club.
Figure 5 The Process by Which an Agent Removes Individuals From its Social Networks.
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type. Thus, even though affiliated and unaffiliated agents 
accepted prosocial action opportunities at the same rate, 
affiliated agents were more regularly presented with 
prosocial action opportunities. These dynamics within 
the simulation are shown in Figure 7. 
Passive Prosociality
Based on WVS data, individuals affiliated with a 
supernatural worldview club had significantly lower 
levels of trust (M = 26.0%, SD = 0.44) than the unaffiliated 
(M = 28.0%, SD = 0.45), t(15622) = –2.82, p < 0.01.
The agent-based simulation yielded similar results 
to the WVS trust data. Recall, trust was operationalized 
as the total size of an agent’s social networks relative 
to maximum size of all agents’ social networks. In the 
simulation, the average trust score for agents affiliated 
with supernatural worldview clubs (M = 0.46, SD = 0.23) 
was significantly lower than the average trust score for 
unaffiliated agents (M = 0.54, SD = 0.26), t(15823) = 
–8.81, p < 0.01.
In the ABM, relative to affiliated agents, unaffiliated 
agents had a larger total social network (and thus higher 
trust score) because of their larger online and offline 
social networks. This was attributable to the lower 
number of negative interactions that the unaffiliated 
had with outgroup agents, making the outgroup agents 
less likely to be removed from their networks. Despite the 
additional social network of affiliated agents (i.e., their 
worldview club), the higher removal rate of outgroup 
agents from their social network was large enough to 
account for the difference in total social network size. 
Figure 8 illustrates this dynamic. 
Based on the WVS data, individuals affiliated with 
supernatural worldview clubs had lower tolerance (M = 
91.2%, SD = 0.28) than the unaffiliated (M = 93.2%, SD = 
0.25), t(14892) = –4.77, p < 0.01.
In the ABM simulation, the average tolerance score 
was also lower for agents affiliated with supernatural 
worldview clubs (M = 0.72, SD = 0.21) relative to the 
unaffiliated (M = 0.79, SD = 0.23), t(16392) = –6.54, p 
< 0.01. In the simulation this occurs because outgroup 
suspicion (inverse tolerance) was one of the conditions 
that, when interacting with other conditions, may have 
led an agent to affiliate with a supernatural worldview 
club. This created a social network for an affiliated agent 
in which the average member was likely to have had 
lower tolerance values than the rest of the population. 
Furthermore, the within-network interactions were likely 
to decrease or maintain an agent’s tolerance because 
the majority-majority interactions with the supernatural 
worldview club social network were with agents likely to 
have lower tolerance. These dynamics are highlighted in 
Figure 9. 
RESEARCH QUESTION #2: IS PROSOCIALITY 
BASED ON SUPERNATURAL WORLDVIEW?
Active Prosociality
Within the WVS data, those with supernatural worldview 
were more actively prosocial (i.e., voluntary acts) than 
those with a naturalist worldview (M = 32.4%, SD = 
0.47 versus M = 26.2%, SD = 0.44 respectively), t(1729) 
= 5.04, p < 0.01. However, when excluding tribal active 
prosociality, these two groups no longer significantly 
differed (M = 26.1%, SD = 0.44 versus M = 26.2%, SD = 
0.44, t(28758) = 0, p < 0.01).
The agent-based simulation yielded very similar 
results. Agents with supernatural worldviews were 
more likely to be actively prosocial (M = 31.7%, SD = 
0.41) than agents without supernatural worldviews (M 
= 26.8%, SD = 0.40), t(1843) = 4.91, p < 0.01. However, 
when tribal prosociality was excluded, active prosociality 
was equivalent between those with (M = 26.8%, SD = 
0.40) and without (M = 26.8%, SD = 0.40) a supernatural 
worldview, t(28758) = 0, p < 0.01. In the ABM, this 
occurred because: (1) agents were required to have a 
supernatural worldview to be affiliated a supernatural 
worldview club and (2) only agents affiliated with a 
supernatural worldview club had tribal prosocial actions 
generated for them. 
Because those agents with a supernatural 
worldview had an additional source of prosocial action 
opportunities (i.e., tribal ones) they received more 
RQ # METHOD ALL ACTIONS EXCLUDING TRIBAL ACTIONS PASSIVE PROSOCIALITY
TRUST (TR); TOLERANCE (TOL)
#1 Data Analysis Yes (p < 0.01) Yes (p < 0.01) Tr: Yes (p < 0.01); Tol: Yes (p < 0.01)
#1 Simulation Yes (p < 0.01) Yes (p < 0.01) Tr: Yes (p < 0.01); Tol: Yes (p < 0.01)
#2 Data Analysis Yes (p < 0.01) No (p = 0.54) Tr: Yes (p < 0.01); Tol: Yes (p < 0.01)
#2 Simulation Yes (p < 0.01) No (p = 0.53) Tr: Yes (p < 0.01); Tol: Yes (p < 0.01)
#3 Data Analysis NA NA Tr: Yes (p < 0.01); Tol: Yes (p < 0.01)
#3 Simulation NA NA Tr: 0.51 vs. 0.51; Tol: Yes (p < 0.01)
#4 Data Analysis NA NA Tr: Yes (p < 0.01); Tol: No (p = 0.03)
#4 Simulation NA NA Tr: Yes (p < 0.01); Tol: No (p = 0.04)
Table 2 Summary of Results for Research Questions.
12Galen et al. Secularism and Nonreligion DOI: 10.5334/snr.128
action opportunities. This dynamic was absent when 
tribal prosocial actions were excluded from the analysis. 
Unaffiliated individuals with a supernatural worldview 
were the least prosocially active group because they 
had higher outgroup suspicion than those with a 
naturalist worldview, which limited the size of their 
online and offline social networks. Higher outgroup 
suspicion was attributable to the inclusion of individuals 
who recently left a supernatural worldview club due 
to: (1) negative interactions with members of the club 
or (2) inconsistent actions from the exemplar along 
with an outgroup suspicion value below the specified 
threshold. The time these individuals spent with the 
worldview club increased their outgroup suspicion and 
limited the number of prosocial opportunities generated 
for them as shown in Figure 9.
Figure 10 shows that all three groups accepted 
prosocial action opportunities at the same rate. However, 
it also shows significantly fewer opportunities were 
generated for unaffiliated individuals with a supernatural 
worldview. Figure 11 illustrates how this was attributable 
to the lower number of opportunities available, which in 
turn was a result of smaller social networks relative to 
unaffiliated individuals with a naturalist worldview.
Passive Prosociality
Our analyses of the WVS data showed that individuals with 
supernatural worldviews had lower trust levels (M = 26.1%, 
SD = 0.44) than those without supernatural worldviews (M 
= 36.6%, SD = 0.48), t(1640) = –7.88, p < 0.01.
The agent-based simulation yielded similar results in 
that the average trust score was lower for agents with 
Figure 7 The Average Likelihood of Each Type of Prosocial Action Opportunity Generated and Accepted for Affiliated and Unaffiliated 
Agents.
Figure 8 The Size of Social Network Types Relative to Maximum Total Size of all Social Networks by Type of Affiliation.
13Galen et al. Secularism and Nonreligion DOI: 10.5334/snr.128
supernatural worldviews (M = 0.49, SD = 0.46) than for 
those with naturalist worldviews (M = 0.68, SD = 0.51), 
t(1921) = –8.16, p < 0.01. 
Within the context of the simulation, agents with a 
naturalist worldview had a larger total social network 
(and thus higher trust score) than affiliated agents 
Figure 9 The Change in Outgroup Suspicion (Inverse Tolerance) During Time Affiliated With Supernatural Worldview Clubs.
Figure 10 The Likelihood of Prosocial Action Opportunity Type Generated and Accepted by Worldview and Affiliation status.
Figure 11 The Social Network Size by Worldview and Affiliation Status.
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because unaffiliated agents had larger online and offline 
social networks. The difference in the size of the online 
and offline social networks occurred because agents with 
a naturalist worldview were less likely to have negative 
interactions with outgroup agents due to their greater 
tolerance (lower outgroup suspicion). This made agents 
with a naturalist worldview less likely to remove outgroup 
agents from their online and offline social networks. The 
difference in degree of removal of outgroup agents as a 
function of worldview is noteworthy (just as it was for 
affiliated agents in Research Question #1). On the one 
hand, those agents with a supernatural worldview had 
an additional social network that agents with a naturalist 
worldview did not have, a supernatural worldview club. 
However, the rate at which agents with a supernatural 
worldview removed outgroup agents from their network 
was large enough to result in a significantly smaller social 
network size than agents with a naturalist worldview (see 
Figure 12). Thus, any expansive effect of the supernatural 
worldview club on network size was offset by outgroup 
agent removal.
Furthermore, the social network size for unaffiliated 
agents with a supernatural worldview were still smaller 
than those with a naturalist worldview. This was 
attributable to the inclusion of individuals who recently 
left a supernatural worldview club due to: (1) negative 
interactions with the exemplar agent in the club or (2) 
inconsistent actions from the exemplar paired with 
tolerance above the specified threshold. This resulted 
in lower than average tolerance for unaffiliated agents 
with a supernatural worldview which created smaller 
online and offline social networks than individuals with a 
naturalist worldview.
Based on the WVS data, individuals with supernatural 
worldviews had lower tolerance (M = 92.1%, SD = 0.27) 
than those with naturalist worldviews (M = 94.0%, SD = 
0.24), t(1772) = –2.66, p < 0.01.
Likewise, in the ABM simulation, the average tolerance 
score was lower for agents with supernatural worldviews 
(M = 0.78, SD = 0.56) than those with naturalist worldviews 
(M = 0.86, SD = 0.58), t(1948) = –6.81, p < 0.01.
In the simulation, this occurs because the group of 
individuals with a supernatural worldview included: 
(1) agents affiliated with a supernatural worldview club 
and (2) agents who previously were part of a supernatural 
worldview club but later became unaffiliated and 
(3) agents with a supernatural worldview who never 
affiliated. Recall that affiliated agents had lower 
tolerance than unaffiliated agents. However, among 
unaffiliated agents, those with supernatural worldviews 
had even lower tolerance than those with naturalist 
worldviews. This occurred because a previous affiliation 
with a supernatural worldview club tended to result in 
agents who retained their supernatural worldview even 
subsequent to disaffiliation. These agents had a higher 
outgroup suspicion value (and thus lower tolerance 
score) than agents who were never affiliated with a 
supernatural worldview club. In the simulation it took a 
significant amount of time for these previously affiliated 
agents to dramatically change their tolerance.
RESEARCH QUESTION #3: DO CHANGES IN 
PASSIVE PROSOCIALITY PRECEDE CHANGES IN 
WORLDVIEW?
Two measures of passive prosociality were assessed 
in the longitudinal WVS data. There was no significant 
Figure 12 Average change in Outgroup Suspicion (Inverse Tolerance) After Disaffiliating With a Supernatural Worldview Club.
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difference in level of trust between those who changed 
their worldview from supernatural to naturalist (M = 
35.4%, SD = 0.48) and those who changed from naturalist 
to supernatural (M = 34.9%, SD = 0.48), t(9176) = 0.43, p 
= 0.66). However, prior tolerance was higher in those who 
changed their worldview from supernatural to naturalist 
(M = 94.3%, SD = 0.23) than individuals who changed 
worldview from naturalist to supernatural (M = 92.1%, SD 
= 0.27), t(5629) = 3.44, p < 0.01.
Within the context of the simulation we distinguished 
between agents who changed their worldview from 
supernatural to naturalist (or vice versa) using the 
following criteria: the agent must have had their 
previous worldview for 26 time steps prior to the 
worldview change and must have kept their new 
worldview for 26 time steps after the change. Using 
these criteria for the ABM, a pattern similar to the WVS 
results emerged. Trust levels were the same (M = 0.51, 
SD = 0.46) for agents who changed their worldview from 
supernatural to naturalist and for those (M = 0.51, SD 
= 0.45) who changed from naturalist to supernatural, 
t(8981) = 0.18, p = 0.51. However, agents who changed 
their worldview from supernatural to naturalist were 
more likely to exhibit tolerance prior to the change 
(M = 0.84, SD = 0.48) than agents who changed from 
naturalist to supernatural (M = 0.78, SD = 0.46), t(6026) 
= 7.14, p < 0.01).
The modeling simulation revealed the dynamics 
underlying these processes. It was much more 
common for unaffiliated supernatural believers to 
transition over time to a naturalistic worldview, 
and almost all agents with such a transition were 
unaffiliated. Since having a supernatural worldview 
was a precondition to affiliating with a supernatural 
worldview club, every agent that transitioned from a 
naturalistic to a supernatural worldview was initially 
unaffiliated, by definition. Most of the interactions that 
caused these agents to become conflicted with their 
naturalistic worldview occurred with homophilous 
(i.e., sharing the agent’s minority or majority status) 
agents who had low levels of tolerance, which 
increased the likelihood of transition to affiliation with 
a supernatural worldview club. As outlined above, 
although affiliated agents had larger club-based social 
networks, they also had smaller outgroup networks, 
which reduced the chances of encounters that could 
lead to worldview conflict. Those agents who changed 
from supernatural to naturalistic worldviews had high 
tolerance, making it more likely that they would have 
positive interactions with alter agents of a different 
majority/minority designation. This further increased 
tolerance and maintained the size of their social 
networks. As a result, agents’ chances of having a 
conflictual interaction regarding their supernatural 
worldview increased, ultimately leading them in a 
naturalistic direction.
RESEARCH QUESTION #4: DO CHANGES IN 
PASSIVE PROSOCIALITY PRECEDE CHANGES IN 
AFFILIATION WITH WORLDVIEW CLUBS?
Based on the longitudinal WVS data, levels of trust 
prior to affiliation change were higher for those who 
changed their status from affiliated to unaffiliated with 
a supernatural worldview club (M = 22.5%, SD = 0.41) 
compared to those who changed from unaffiliated 
to affiliated (M = 18.5%, SD = 0.39), t(9176) = 4.88, p 
< 0.01. Regarding levels of tolerance, there was not a 
statistically significant difference t(9160) = –2.3117, p 
= 0.028), between individuals holding a supernatural 
worldview who changed from affiliated to unaffiliated (M 
= 90.8%, SD = 0.29) and individuals who changed from 
unaffiliated to affiliated (M = 92.0%, SD = 0.27). The lack 
of a statistically significant difference here is because we 
set our threshold for statistical significance at 0.01.
Within the context of the simulation we distinguished 
between agents who changed their affiliation status but 
maintained a supernatural worldview using the following 
criteria: the agent must have had a supernatural 
worldview and their affiliation status for 26 time steps 
prior to the affiliation change and must have kept their 
new affiliation status and a supernatural worldview for 
26 time steps after the affiliation. Data collection for the 
passive prosociality prior to the affiliation status change 
reflects the average trust and tolerance score prior to the 
agent’s affiliation change.
Similar to the WVS results, in the ABM simulation 
levels of trust prior to change in agents’ affiliation status 
differed as a function of the direction of change. Agents 
who disaffiliated exhibited more trust (M = 0.51, SD = 
0.37) than agents who changed from unaffiliated to 
affiliated (M = 0.44, SD = 0.35), t(9236) = 5.97, p < 0.01. 
In contrast, agents with a supernatural worldview who 
disaffiliated did not differ in levels of tolerance (M = 0.73, 
SD = 0.41) from agents who changed from unaffiliated 
to affiliated (M = 0.74, SD = 0.40), t(9058)  = –1.09, p = 
0.04. The lack of a statistically significant difference here 
is because we set our threshold for statistical significance 
at 0.01.
In the simulation, these patterns were attributable to 
both groups of agents having had low tolerance values 
(high outgroup suspicion values) prior to their change. 
Recall that the interactions resulting from affiliation in 
a supernatural worldview club, even for those affiliated 
agents who eventually became unaffiliated, limited their 
tolerance values. Furthermore, the majority (64%) of 
unaffiliated agents with a supernatural worldview who 
later became affiliated did so because they achieved a 
tolerance value that was sufficiently low to qualify them 
for affiliation, even if they acted in a manner inconsistent 
with a supernatural worldview. The 26 time steps of 
tolerance data for the agents who later became affiliated 
indicated that their tolerance steadily decreased as their 
decision to become affiliated approached. Consequently, 
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tolerance levels did not differ as a function of change in 
affiliation.
The low tolerance (and high outgroup suspicion) for 
both groups resulted in smaller online and offline social 
networks. However, those individuals who were affiliated 
prior to their change had an additional social network 
that the unaffiliated agents did not: their supernatural 
worldview club. This resulted in higher trust scores for 
the affiliated agents prior to their choice to become 
unaffiliated. Since unaffiliated agents did not have this 
additional social network prior to affiliation they initially 
had lower trust scores.
DISCUSSION
Can the use of modeling and simulation in conjunction 
with real-world data lend new perspectives to the types 
of complex problems involved in the study of (non)religion 
and prosociality? The interaction of numerous variables 
in dynamic, multi-causal, recursive relationships in these 
phenomena has made research in this field difficult. The 
statistical and modeling analyses reported here focus on 
these types of variables, including prosocial outcomes 
that operate as a function of changes in individuals’ 
worldview beliefs, group affiliation, and social network 
properties. Taken together, data from the WVS and the 
ABM simulation studies paint a similar picture of how 
prosociality is shaped by group affiliation and worldviews. 
Both data sets indicated that individuals’ affiliation was 
more relevant to predicting prosocial behaviors than their 
worldview beliefs, whether religious or secular. Relatedly, 
the higher level of prosociality seen among those with 
supernatural, as compared to naturalistic, beliefs is 
primarily attributable to the fact that the former also 
tend to be affiliated with a worldview club. 
The unique capacities of ABM are best exemplified in 
their ability to tease out the effects of several mechanisms 
unfolding at the same time. One such result pertains 
to the process by which active prosociality manifests 
in tribal (as opposed to universal) forms. As noted in 
the introduction, it has long been observed that the 
higher ingroup prosociality associated with religiously-
affiliated groups tends to exist along with tribal or 
parochial attitudes (Putnam & Campbell, 2010). The ABM 
analysis illustrates how variation in active volunteering, 
as well as tolerance and trust, are affected by agents’ 
social network parameters. Agents with supernatural 
worldviews performed more prosocial actions than 
those with a naturalistic worldview but only for tribal, 
not universal, actions. The ABM illustrated how the more 
extensive within-group social contacts and the greater 
number of opportunities provided by supernatural 
worldview clubs promoted active prosociality in the form 
of volunteering for their members, while at the same 
time limiting their contact with outside-group alters, 
thereby increasing homophily. This illustrates the paradox 
of group affiliation at the core of the diverging patterns 
of religious and nonreligious prosociality. The social 
network factors of supernatural worldview groups that 
boost active prosociality also corrode passive prosociality 
such as tolerance of different others. 
Why does tolerance tend to be characteristic of the 
nonreligious rather than the religious? The simulation 
studies also provide further information about the 
pattern, mentioned above, by which religious affiliation 
appears to coincide with lower tolerance of outgroup 
members. The same club membership effect that creates 
opportunities for tribal prosocial helping also increases 
outgroup suspicion and network homophily. The ABM 
helps to reveal the dynamics that drive this process. 
In the simulation, the majority-majority or minority-
minority interactions of agents within the club network 
tended to be with alters who themselves had high levels 
of outgroup suspicion, which increased agents’ own 
suspicion. This “homophilizing” effect led to affiliated 
agents’ purging divergent alters from their network. By 
contrast, the unaffiliated were less likely to have negative 
interactions with outgroup alters, who were less likely 
to be removed from their networks, a process which 
boosted tolerance by allowing a diverse network.
How are qualities of tolerance and trust related to 
the process of changing beliefs and affiliation? As with 
previous studies (Loveland, Capella & Maisonet 2017; 
Welch, Sikkink & Loveland 2007) our analysis indicated 
that individuals with a naturalistic worldview are more 
trusting and tolerant of others than individuals with a 
supernatural worldview (especially when the latter are 
religiously affiliated). The WVS longitudinal data indicated 
that those who changed from religious belief to nonbelief 
were more likely earlier on to display tolerance of others, 
compared to individuals whose belief changes went 
in the other direction. Likewise, those who eventually 
disaffiliated from a supernatural worldview club were 
more likely to display trust of others prior to disaffiliation 
compared to those individuals who become affiliated. 
This illustrates some distinctness in indices: for worldview 
change, previous tolerance is more relevant; for changes 
in affiliation, previous trust is more important. 
The capacity of the ABM to simulate repeated 
interactions over time provides a greater understanding 
of how the process of change plays out in agents’ 
social networks. The low outgroup suspicion values of 
agents who changed from supernatural to naturalistic 
worldviews led to more positive interactions with agents 
of a different majority/minority designation, which 
further reduced outgroup suspicion and produced a 
heterogeneous social network. In this way, we see 
that social diversity (or low parochialism) can play a 
causal role in changing supernatural worldviews. This is 
reminiscent of the processes of polarization, discussed in 
the introduction, in which early differences in personality 
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lead to self-selection into different environments, 
thereby potentiating further change. In practical terms, 
the solitary journey reported by many apostates may 
be attributable to a form of survivor bias: those who 
questioned religious worldviews but who did receive social 
support from religious individuals in their environment 
may have retained their faith, which prevented them 
from disaffiliation or secularization. 
IMPLICATIONS 
ABM methodologies are increasingly being used in 
the scientific study of nonreligion and secularity to 
illuminate these complex social processes. Here we 
have shown how this methodology, in conjunction 
with other approaches such as statistical analysis of 
real-life survey data sets, can illuminate the causal 
dynamics shaping the relationship between religion 
and prosociality. We think that such tools can be helpful 
whenever scholars of nonreligion and secularity are 
faced with complex phenomena about which there are 
multiple testable theories aimed at determining the 
causal role of specific types of beliefs and behaviors 
operating within complex social relationships. Currently 
in the field of the cognitive sciences of religion there are 
vigorous debates over the relative contribution of traits 
such as analytical cognition, faith in intuition, actively 
open-minded thinking, anthropomorphic tendencies, 
and other modes of thought that have been linked to 
lower religious and spiritual belief. Other members of 
our research team are developing models that address 
these issues.  
As noted in the introduction, there is a current 
theoretical debate regarding the necessity or role 
of religion in establishing prosocial norms. As was 
demonstrated in the present findings, secular prosociality 
in the form of greater outgroup trust, openness, and 
tolerance of social heterogeneity, is more common 
among nonreligious agents. However, active prosociality 
in forms such as volunteering, charity, and other types 
of civic participation, is relatively less-developed among 
secularists, who may need alternative mechanisms 
that facilitate further improvement. As we have seen, 
one mechanism used to great effect by religious groups 
(although not requiring supernatural belief) is the 
promotion of participation in groups with close social ties, 
exposure to prosocial models and norms (exemplars), 
and frequent requests and opportunities for volunteering. 
The study of specifically nonreligious and secular groups 
is relatively new, with only a limited range of secular 
clubs for comparison. But clearly, niches are being filled 
by groups with differing emphases. For example, Sunday 
Assembly, the Center for Inquiry, and other humanist 
groups span a range of agendas (Cimino & Smith 2014; 
Smith 2017). Although not all secular or nonreligious 
groups prioritize prosociality, those that do so likely 
utilize the same social capital-generating mechanisms 
that are present in any group that effectively promotes 
prosociality. 
Another specific implication of the current results 
for secularism pertains to the relationship between 
diverse social networks and negative attitudes towards 
the nonreligious because of their perceived immorality 
(Gervais et al. 2017). Our results indicated that increasing 
the heterogeneity of networks by the inclusion of 
naturalistic examplars may decrease distrust of the 
nonreligious in general. Other research has shown that 
when religious people are made aware that atheists 
are more common than they originally supposed, this 
reduces distrust in atheists (Gervais, Sheriff & Norenzayan 
2011). We also found that positive contact with the 
non-religious or non-affiliated could increase levels 
of tolerance. Therefore, the nonreligious may benefit 
from becoming more visible in the broader community 
and embodying prosociality in a way that contradicts 
common stereotypes. 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
One limitation of the present model is the number 
of variables included. It would be productive for 
future studies to also include alternative individual 
difference variables such as personality, cognitive, 
and demographics parameters, which are known or 
suspected to be closely tied to both social functioning 
and religiosity (or the lack thereof). One variable that 
should be given future consideration is the strength of 
worldview conviction (e.g., importance of beliefs). The 
degree of conviction with which individuals hold their 
worldviews or the importance they place on them is 
arguably of greater importance than belief content 
(Galen & Kloet 2011b). Whereas most research has 
treated devout religious individuals as being the polar 
opposite of staunch atheists, they actually share the 
commonality of being strongly committed to their 
worldview. Belief strength is reflected in prosocial 
behaviors as well. Petrovic et al. (2018) found that 
religious attendance frequency correlated with the 
overall likelihood of volunteering, but individuals’ 
personal importance of religion predicted the amount of 
time spent volunteering. Including such variables could 
improve both the explanatory and predictive power of 
models. 
Related research has shown that the inclusion 
of worldview intensity, gender and education-level 
enabled an agent-based model to forecast existential 
security more accurately than several competing 
statistical models (Gore et al. 2018). The results of 
the latter study showed in social networks where the 
majority of agents have completed post-secondary 
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education, agents have on average a steeper decline in 
their religious practices and belief in God than agents 
connected to social networks where the majority of 
agents have not completed post-secondary education. 
This dynamic enables the agent-based model, for a 
given country and a given time period, to provide a more 
accurate forecast of changes in the existential security 
and the religiosity than two alternative approaches 
for a specific time period for specific countries. In 
future work, we plan to highlight how the inclusion 
of these types of variables within our model creates 
a more detailed explanation of the patterns observed 
in the WVS. In addition, we will evaluate the ability 
of the prosociality model presented here to forecast 
outcomes related to the model’s operationalization of 
prosociality. 
Another factor that may be useful to include in future 
modeling studies is the degree of normative fit between 
agents’ worldviews and their broader environment or 
network. An atheist living in the southern United States 
shares at least one thing in common with an evangelical 
Christian living in downtown Copenhagen: in their 
environment, they are atypical. The relationship between 
individuals’ religiosity and prosociality varies as a function 
of the cultural emphasis or norms regarding religion 
(Stavrova & Siegers 2014). Future computer models 
should therefore incorporate variables representing the 
degree of fit between agent’s worldview vis a vis the 
predominant worldview of the culture in which he or she 
is embedded. 
Despite their limitations, we have argued that ABM 
methods can be a valuable addition to the research 
toolkit of scholars of secularism and nonreligion. 
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS  
Link to online repository of supplementary materials – 
https://github.com/rossgore/modrna-publication.
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